[tailscale]

4 editions · 4 items

October 29, 2026

Tailscale shipped 1.104.4, fixing the Tailworm findings: SSH Unix-socket forwarding ran as root after a path check that could be raced, letting a permitted peer reach root-only sockets such as the Docker socket or the tailscaled local API (TS-2026-014), plus SSH session memory exhaustion (TS-2026-015) and Serve Unix backends reaching privileged sockets (TS-2026-016). Forwarding now runs as the logged-in user; the PoC was given only to Tailscale and is not public (Tailscale, investigation update) (earlier coverage). · Vulnerabilities & Exploits

October 28, 2026

Tailscale has confirmed the Tailworm findings are serious and is rushing fixes after Cyberdione Labs published 11 unpatched flaws found in an audit of Tailscale 1.104.2 and headscale 0.29.5. The worst is root code execution on target servers via Unix-socket forwarding in the root-running embedded SSH server; app connectors can reach cloud metadata and, on Kubernetes, every cluster service; self-hosted headscale can be crashed unauthenticated (BleepingComputer, SecurityWeek). (earlier coverage) · Vulnerabilities & Exploits

October 27, 2026

Tailworm details multiple high-severity Tailscale SSH flaws. The assessment of Tailscale v1.104.2 and headscale v0.29.5 describes authorized SSH sessions abusing unix-socket forwarding (ssh -L/-R) through race conditions and missing privilege drops to reach or replace privileged sockets such as Docker or systemd — root control, enrollment-key theft, and worm-like lateral spread. App-connector features that bypass network ACLs to reach cloud metadata are also covered (@blackorbird) (earlier coverage). @MiraZephyre notes tailscale set --ssh=false disables the feature on hosts that don't need it, with ordinary sshd on the tailnet IP still working. · Vulnerabilities & Exploits

October 26, 2026

The Tailworm report describes an authorized foothold-to-root path through Tailscale SSH. In a three-day lab assessment of Tailscale 1.104.2 and headscale 0.29.5, an already compromised and ACL-authorized device allegedly used SSH forwarding through the root-running Tailscale process to reach privileged Unix sockets on peers. Hosted Tailscale can disable forwarding per rule; the tested headscale version cannot. There is no CVE, bulletin or fixed release, the PoC remains private, and no independent researcher has reproduced the findings. Tailscale says it is fixing issues in the same area but has not confirmed the report’s specific claims (Tailworm report, The Hacker News). · Vulnerabilities & Exploits